This paper presents empirical wage analyses in Japan on the basis of the framework of Saito(2005) . Data arranged by cohorts enable analyses on the effect of the educational advancement rate with regard to the wage ratio. Empirical results in Japan suggest that a statistical trick causes most of the wage ratio changes. Further, the real effects of higher education on wages range from slightly negative to insignificant.
Introduction
The object of this paper is to measure the magnitude of the fallacy demonstrated in Saito (2005) and the real effects of higher education on wages in Japan. Saito (2005) reveals the fallacy of the wage ratio using simple simulation analyses. The wage differentials and returns to education would be biased by the fallacy. However, the empirical magnitude of the fallacy remains unclear. This paper begins by confirming the considerable magnitude of the fallacy in Japan. Furthermore, the fallacy also provides a clue to measuring the real effects of higher education. I analyze the real effects of higher education on wage in Japan.
We have two major theories to analyze the effect of education or schools on economics. The first theory is the human capital theory, which considers schools to be institutions for the formation of human capital, as represented by Becker (1964) . Schools increase their students' productivity and wages. The other theory, the signaling or screening theory, states that advancement to higher education eliminates asymmetric information, as suggested by Spence (1973) . Students can reveal their productivity by advancing to higher education. Raising productivity in schools is not a requirement for the signaling theory.
Numerous discussions and analyses have been conducted to determine which of the two theories is more practical. In early research stages, Griliches (1977) summarizes that consistent estimators of the causal effects of education cannot be obtained by ordinary least squares. Educational status is a textbook example of an endogenous variable. Subsequent empirical studies make efforts to take into account unobserved ability and self-selection. Card (2001) reviews empirical studies in the 1990s.
However, it is difficult to distinguish the pre-school effects from the in-school ones. Moreover, one theory does not violate the other. Previous attempts to empirically distinguish between the two have been inconclusive. In contrast, this paper provides a judgement in Japan.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data from the Basic Surveys on Wage Structures in Japan. Section 3 analyzes the college/high-school wage ratio which is used as a primary indicator of the wage differential between educational statuses. Section 4 approaches the real effects of higher education using the ratio of quartiles. Section 5 analyzes the wage ratio on weighted averages of employees in accordance with the principles stated in Saito (2005) . Section 6 presents the conclusions and provides caveats on the interpretations. 
Data
The primary data for this paper has been obtained from 28 consecutive Basic Survey on Wage Structures (BSWS) for the survey years 1976 to 2003. BSWS provides the most comprehensive wage data in Japan.
It is compiled by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. It is also the one of the most reliable and long-running wage data in the world.
1 Each survey provides wage information based on approximately 1.5 million employees.
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I use standard data collected from private establishments with 10 or more regular employees. BSWS has four classes of educational attainment or its equivalents: [1] graduates from junior high-schools, [2] graduates from high-schools, [3] graduates from higher professional schools and junior colleges, and [4] graduates from universities. 3 In order to correspond to the annual wage, the wage data are calculated by adding the annual special cash earnings to twelve times the contractual monthly cash earnings in June.
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It is a prime indicator of statistics in this kind of analysis. 
The wage ratio between college and high-school graduates
This section analyzes the wage ratio between college and high-school graduates, which is considered as a primary indicator of the wage differential between educational statuses. The college/high-school wage ratio can be calculated by dividing the average annual wages of [4] graduates from universities by that of [2] graduates from high-schools in BSWS. Result-1 displays the college/high-school wage ratios of male employees as five tables.
There are three ways to analyze these tables in Result-1. Firstly, the cells on the slant line going from the upper-right to the lower-left indicate the same time of the survey. Each table lines up from the upper-left line to the lower-right for every 5 surveys. Secondly, each row shows the 1 I have conducted a detailed analysis of the US in a manner similar to Japan, using data from 35 consecutive March Current Population Surveys. The result is obscure and inconclusive, mainly because of statistical errors and sample paucity. However, it is highly beneficial to use cohorts instead of time-lines. The wage ratio of white males shows a large discontinuity in the cohort of those born in the 1950s, but not in the time of the late 1980s. Basically, the results are consistent with those of Card and DiNardo (2002) . 2 The definition of an employee in the data is one of the following: [1] Employees hired for an indefinite period. [2] Employees hired for longer than one month. [3] Employees hired for less than one month or by the day and who were hired for 18 days or more in April and May. 3 Universities include graduate schools. 4 BSWS is based on pre-tax wage. 5 The annual wage or one-twelfth of the annual wage is used in Katz and Revenga (1992) , Ohtake and Inoki (1997), and Genda (1997) . Hourly wage is not common because the working time is hard to measure, especially among highly-educated employees. Brunello and Ariga (1997) use hourly wages to correspond with the literature on earning functions. Although I have used hourly wages instead of the annual wages, the principal results given in this paper are robust.
2 same age bracket. Information regarding change in wages within the same age bracket can be obtained by checking along a row. Thirdly, the columns show the same birth bracket data. Each column provides cohort wage information. The effect of the birth bracket is the most important aspect to be considered in this paper.
As a matter of course, the cohorts that were between 20 and 24 years old in 
If a cell contains a value, the corresponding age and birth bracket variables equal one, and the other variables equal zero. On considering that the intercept α as the estimator of a dummy constantly takes the value one, all variables in the equation are composed of dummy variables. 8 Throughout this paper, I use the observations of the age brackets from 20-24 to 55-59 years old and the birth brackets from 6 As noted in the Result-1, the recorded age in BSWS is counted on June 30. Although it does not exactly correspond with birth year, I have used the term for the sake of simplicity. 7 The method is used in Deaton and Paxson (1994) and Ohtake and Inoki (1997) . 8 This estimation method is a special case of fixed effects estimation. 1921-1926 to 1978-1983 . The number of observations is 219. To avoid multicollinearity, each bracket variable has to take one reference group. I set the youngest and the earliest brackets from among the observations as the reference groups. The reference brackets are the age bracket of 20-24 years old and the birth bracket of [1921] [1922] [1923] [1924] [1925] [1926] . In addition, this dummy variable regression leads to neither the customary standard error nor the t-value [Appendix 1.A].
Result-2A is the estimation result of the college/high-school wage ratio of male employees. While
Result-2A indicates that the wage ratio increases almost linearly with aging, the birth bracket effects decrease from the high level of the 1920s. Despite the disturbance caused by the initial effects, on the whole, the birth bracket effects increase after they decrease along with the generational progress. This transition matches the simulation result of mountain-shaped distributions shown in Saito (2005) . However, Saito (2005) demonstrates the wage ratio transition based on monotonically increasing advancement rate. The college advancement rate of male has not risen monotonically in Japan. Both the Ministry of Education statistics and the share of employees in BSWS report that the college advancement rate of male for the 1960s birth bracket had decreased slightly. I estimate the share of college graduates among employees in the same manner as (1).
[Share of Educational
Result-2C indicates the share of college graduates among male employees. Similarly, Result-2D indicates the share of college graduates among female employees. Although linear estimations do not provide accurate estimates especially in the old cohort, the birth bracket effects show the approximate transition of the share of college graduates. 10 Result-2C shows that the share of college graduates among male 9 Even though the productivity does not correspond to the spot wage such as the efficiency wage, the age brackets control them. 10 Some estimated values of the 20-24 age bracket in the old cohort are negative. However, as far as the birth bracket 4 employees had decreased slightly at the 1960s birth bracket. There seems to be a discrepancy between simulations in Saito (2005) and data in Japan.
The reason for the discrepancy is that the wage ratio between [4] graduates from universities and [2] graduates from high-schools in BSWS does not satisfy one of the assumptions in the simulations. The simulations in Saito (2005) demonstrate the relationship between one dividing line and the wage ratio. On the other hand, the wage ratio taken from BSWS considers the two educational statuses of high-school and university graduates, excluding the other two statuses. Using the same estimation as Result-2C
and Result-2D, I have estimated the share of other three educational statuses by gender. The graphs in Result-3 highlight the estimated share of educational statuses among 25-29 and 35-39 years old.
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Result-3A and Result-3B show that the share of graduates from higher professional schools and junior colleges in male employees increases on the 1960s birth bracket.
An amendment to the School Education Law in 1975 curbed the increase in the college advancement rate. Since the amendment erected legal frameworks for higher professional schools, the share of higher professional school graduates increased rapidly.
12 As a result, the share of college graduates among male employees had decreased slightly on the cohorts. As mentioned in Saito (2005) , different rates of decrease of the higher and lower average cause the change in the wage ratio. In the simulated situation, both the numerator and the denominator decrease. However, if the intermediate educational status between the higher and the lower expands, the average capability of higher educational status increases and the average capability of lower educational status decreases. Wherever the dividing line is, the wage ratio between the higher and the lower educational status would increase.
The ratio of quartiles and net human capital loss
The simulation of four educational categories require strong assumptions about distribution and parameters. Even though I assume a mountain-shaped distribution, there is no general result without specifying parameters. A simple approach without specifying parameters is integration by weighted average. For example, the average wage of lower educational status is calculated from the weighted average of [1] graduates from junior high-schools and [2] graduates from high-schools. Similarly, the average wage of higher educational status is calculated from the weighted average of [3] graduates from higher professional effects show an approximate share transition, it need not be taken into consideration. Even if I estimate without observation of the 20-24 age bracket, the main results are robust. 11 The dummy variable regression necessarily makes the sum of the share estimates to be 1 [Appendix 1.B]. 12 The share of graduates from higher professional schools and junior colleges among male employees was about 6% in the birth brackets of late 1950s. This share had increased to 12% in the birth brackets of late 1960s. According to the Ministry of Education statistics, the share of male junior college graduates had decreased at that time.
schools and junior colleges and [4] graduates from universities. However, the weighted average method requires that the human capital formation effects of schools be negligible.
As discussed in Saito (2005) , regardless of human capital formation, the wage ratio of the mountainshaped distribution increases after it decreases once along with the increase in the educational advancement rate. Therefore, the trends of college/high-school wage ratio do not imply that human capital formation in higher education is small. The wage ratios of averages cannot identify the effects of human capital formation. Therefore, I describe a primitive approach to identify the effects of human capital formation.
Let me present the primitive approach with A, B and C, as in the beginning of Section 2 in Saito (2005) . Generally, the wage ratios
and A+B 2 C do not balance even if higher education has no effect.
However, if higher education has no effect on wages, there are ratios that always balance regardless of the position of the dividing line. The ratios are simply
If higher education has no effect, these ratios always remain constant. Conversely, let me assume that higher education forms human capital.
Then, as the phase advances, B proceeds to higher education. In this assumption, the simple result is that the raised denominator decreases The empirical approach is similar to that of the wage ratio between averages. Without separation on the basis of educational statuses, I have tabulated quartile wages by gender. Then, the higher quartile is divided by the lower quartile based on cells in a similar manner to Result-1. If higher education has effects on wages, the ratio changes when the educational advancement rate exceeds 25%, 50%, and 75%. On the contrary, if higher education has no effect on wages, the ratio remains constant in the same situation.
Published BSWS does not record quartiles that are convertible to annual wages. However, BSWS records quartiles of scheduled cash earnings in June. There is a strong correlation between annual wages and scheduled cash earnings. 6 ratio decreases on the birth bracket that the high-school graduate line cut across at 50%. Afterwards, the ratio increases on the birth bracket that the high-school graduate line cut across at 75%. This transition implies that the high-school effect is smaller than that of On-the-Job Training (OJT). In other words, high-schools have net negative effects on the formation of human capital, which is reflected in the wages.
It is a net human capital loss. High-schools repress the human capital that is supposed to be formed in the labor market.
In Result-4A, the quartile ratios change just before the educational partitions pass over the quartiles.
This is consistent if schools repress human capital formation. I present a simple univariate example in Figure 2 . There are nine people numbered 1 through 9 sequentially. Each of them begins with the number of capabilities equal to his/her assigned number. If the dividing line has a negative effect (-2), when does the wage ratio between the medium and the third highest change? When the second most-capable person proceeds to higher education, the fractional number changes from 1.4 to 1.2. This is not the time for the third most-capable person. The point is not phase 3 but phase 2 in Figure 2 . If higher education has net negative effects on wages, the prior change is consistent with the inference.
Result-4B indicates the ratio between the third quartile and the median of male employees. On one hand, the effects of the decrease in the 1930s birth bracket might appear to precede the net human capital loss in colleges as mentioned above. On the other hand, when the higher professional schools and junior colleges partition cut across the median line in the 1970s birth bracket, the ratio decreased. Among
Result-4, this is the only observation that appears to indicate that higher education has positive effects on wages. However, Result-4A seems to indicate that the higher professional schools and junior colleges have negative effects. In general, there is a trend the male wage gap has been diminishing from the 1960s birth bracket. These diminishing gaps would not be attributed to the effects of higher professional schools and junior colleges.
Result-4C indicates the ratio between the median and first quartile of female employees. Similarly, Result-4D indicates the ratio between the third quartile and the median of female employees. When higher quartiles proceed to higher education, the ratios decrease. When lower quartiles proceed to higher education, the ratios increase. According to the information recorded in the graphs, it is possible to consider that the human capital formation effect of higher education is inferior to that of the labor market.
Indeed, the quartile ratios approach according to published BSWS is imprecise to identify educational effects on wages. While the share of college graduates among male employees has exceeded 25% since the The time is dependent on the loss, distribution shape, and the position of the dividing line. If a bivariate distribution of labor productivity and academic ability is introduced, the measurement of the effects would become considerably complicated.
Therefore, further analysis of effects of higher education is extremely difficult because of insufficient data and difficulties in estimation. However, a majority of the quartile ratios imply the net human capital losses in higher education. These losses are, at most, a few percentage points. Although it would still be unwise to conclude that higher education has net negative effects on wages in Japan, it is safe to state that higher education does not have significant positive effects. The net effects range from slightly negative to insignificant. In either case, if the higher education effects are minor, the weighted average procedure is justified as an acceptable approximation.
The wage ratio on weighted averages of employees
This section provides analyses of the wage ratio on weighted averages of employees. The average wage of lower educational status is calculated from the weighted average of [1] graduates from junior highschools and [2] graduates from high-schools. In the same manner, the average wage of higher educational status is calculated from the weighted average of [3] graduates from higher professional schools and junior colleges and [4] graduates from universities. The estimation method for the wage ratio is the same as (1).
Result-5A shows the estimation result of the wage ratio of male employees between the higher educa- in Result-5B is smoother and more stable than that of Result-2B. As the share of graduates from junior colleges has been high in female employees, the transition of the birth bracket effects heavily depends on the manner in which graduates from junior colleges are handled.
Based on the same method as (2), Result-5C reports the result of the dummy variable regression for the share of the higher educational status among male employees. Result-5C indicates that the share of the higher educational status has risen monotonically over its cohorts. This monotonic increase of the share of the higher educational status is different from that of Result-2C. From the birth brackets from 1955 to 1970 in Result-5C, the stable share of higher educational status corresponds to the stable wage ratio in
Result-5A. The wage ratio increased significantly with the rapid increase in the share of higher educational status from the 1970s birth brackets. Result-5D reports the share of the higher educational status among female employees. The share of the female higher educational status has risen monotonically, in a manner similar to that of the males. The wage ratio transition in Result-5B is caused by the monotonic increase in the share of the higher educational status in Result-5D. Katz and Revenga (1992) , Ohtake and Inoki (1997) and Genda (1997) analyze wage differential and the effects of birth brackets (generational effects) using BSWS, as the wage ratio between male college graduates and male high-school graduates. However, these transitions follow the entire distribution rule of the four statuses. Furthermore, the trick of wage ratio is the main cause for the transition.
Meanwhile, these results imply the answer to the question, "Is there substantial skill-biased technological progress in Japan?" It is unlikely that there is substantial skill-biased technological progress in Japan.
The coefficient of determination in Result-5A is 0.9969. Only the birth bracket effects of columns and the age bracket effects of rows can explain almost all the wage ratio variations of male employees. If there was indeed a skill-biased technological progress in Japan, its influence would emerge on the slanting line. The column and row effects would not explain the influence on the slanting line. However, as there is little room for explanation by slanting lines, it appears that there is no substantial skill-biased technological progress in Japan.
Conclusion
This paper has presented empirical wage analyses in Japan using data arranged by cohorts. The effects of higher education on wages range from slightly negative to insignificant from the viewpoint of the entire society. Besides, it is unlikely that there has been any substantial skill-biased technological progress in Japan. The main reason for the transition in wage differentials in Japan is a statistical trick resulting from the distributional divide.
In the process of analyses, I delivered a judgement to the question, "Which is more practical in Japan, the human capital theory or the signaling theory?" Since the empirical results imply net human capital losses, it is safe to state that the signaling theory is more practical in Japan. In terms of wages, the effects of human capital formation due to higher education are either reduced or the same as those of OJT. In general, at least in Japan, higher education is not suitable for fostering of employees.
Even if higher education does not contribute to human capital formation, a separating equilibrium in the signaling model may exist. From the viewpoint of household sectors, there may be an incentive to send out signals even if they pay tuition fee and the opportunity cost. There exists no problem in adding the net human capital loss to other costs. For example, in order to differentiate oneself from another whose capability is 1, a person with a capability of 2 might proceed to higher education even if his/her capability decreases to 1.9.
All analyses in this paper are based on labor productivity from the viewpoint of macroeconomic distribution. Net human capital loss or insignificant effect of higher education depends on the ratio of quartiles from the viewpoint of macroeconomic distribution. I quote from the introduction to the second edition of Becker (1964) 14 However, although the causal effect would be profitable from the viewpoint of households, it remains an illusion, at least in Japan, from the viewpoint of the entire society.
The premise that schooling is a kind of investment for households is common to both the human capital theory and the signaling theory. In reality, there exist other investments that directly contribute to utility or welfare without affecting the economic or wage growth. Education and schools possess aspects of culture that entertains students and the public. However, I believe that if society turns away from accepting the facts, it is the role of the social scientists to dispassionately demonstrate the facts and solutions through research.
14 It is conceivable that two people with the same productivity earn different wages because of a difference in their educational statuses. The reasons might arise from asymmetric information, bargaining power and career requirement in firms. Even though schools do not increase productivity, the causal effects of education may be positive. This explanation should be read along with the tables on the next page. This is an example that does not lead to a loss of generality.
I. Consider a situation where I estimate the effects of rows (α · · · γ) and columns (δ · · · θ) from Table] The shaded cells are unobservable and missing.
II. Each independent variable is set as a dummy variable in [ 2 Estimation Input] .
I have to set reference groups, one for each row and column to avoid multicollinearity.
(In this example, the bases are α and δ.)
III. Including the intercept, the matrix of independent variables, is written in [ 3 X] .
The transpose of X is [ 4 X'] .
IV. The product of X' and X is [ 5 X'X]
• Consider and ζ, these have the same pattern of observation and missing. Due to the similarity in the pattern, they have the same inner products with any independent variable vector φ;
because of the symmetry of inner products. Then, the cofactors of (4,4) and (5,5) in [ 5 X'X] are necessarily equal.
V. Rounding off to two decimal places, the inverse matrix of [ 5 X'X] is written in 6 (X'X) −1 .
• Since both the determinant and the cofactor are the same, the corresponding element in the inverse matrix is necessarily equal.
VI. The product of 6 (X'X) −1 multiplied by s 2 is the variance matrix of coefficients.
• The standard error of and ζ are equal, and fixed proportions of standard errors are predetermined. Although the predicted values are the same, the estimated coefficients depend on the reference groups. Therefore, the dummy variable regression leads to neither the customary standard error nor the t-value. Table] β γ ζ η θ 11. 1.B. The sum of share estimates always equals 1.
The sum of employees' share by educational status always equals 1 in Result-3. Consider a dummy variable regression in this situation:
the vector sum is
Then, all the elements equal 1. Setting the independent variables matrix as X, the predicted value b A for Y A is written in the following manner:
−1 X 1 is the least squares estimate for 1. The estimates for a constant is 0 except for the intercept.
Since all the dependent variables are 1, the estimated coefficient of the intercept is 1.
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